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SOCIAL ENGINEERING THROUGH SHARI’A: ISLAMIC LAW
AND STATE-DIRECTED DA’WA IN CONTEMPORARY ACEH
R. Michael Feener*
Abstract
This study of the contemporary Islamic legal system in Aceh, Indonesia argues
for new attention to be paid to the ways in which contemporary Muslim agendas
for the implementation of Islamic law can be read as projects for futureoriented social transformation—rather than as a series of reactive measures
to perceived ‘crises of modernity’ and/or the political machinations of rival
elites in contesting control of state power. In doing so it highlights the ways
in which the ideals of, and institutional formations developed by, proponents
of Islamic law are configured in relation to a broad range of non-Muslim
modernist projects, including European and American theories of the sociology
of law. rough examinations of these influences on discussions of Islamic law
in Aceh, this essay demonstrates the degrees to which contemporary Sharī’a
implementation is inextricably linked to broader configurations of law, moral
authority, and state power in the modern global order.
Keywords: Islamic law, Social Engineering, Technocrats, Reconstruction,
Development, Indonesia

I. Introduction
The special autonomous region of Aceh, Indonesia, is home to one of
the most complex experiments with the implementation of Islamic law in
the contemporary world. Originally proposed by the Indonesian central
government as a measure to put an end to an armed separatist revolt, the state
project for the implementation of Islamic law in the province was advanced
rapidly in the wake of the devastating 2004 earthquake and tsunami. In
this context, the Sharī’a agenda was significantly reenergized in ways that
dramatically highlighted one of its central aspects: that of using Islamic
law as an instrument of social engineering. Based on a critical analysis of
the ways that the state implementation of Islamic law has been configured
and pursued in the context of post tsunami/post conflict Aceh, I argue for
a re-alignment of analytic perspective in which contemporary Muslim calls
for the implementation of Islamic law can be read as projects for future
oriented social transformation—rather than as a series of reactive measures
to perceived ‘crises of modernity’ and/or the political machinations of rival
elites in contesting control of state power.
II. Islamic Law in Aceh

After Indonesia initiated its ‘Reformasi’ decentralization process in
1999, Aceh was granted the authority to formally implement Islamic law
in the province.1 Law No. 44/1999 formally recognized the ‘Special Status
Correspondence: R. Michael Feener, Asia Research Institute, National University ofSin-
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of the Province of Aceh Special Region’ in the fields of religion, education,
and customary law (adat), and Law No. 18/2001 conferred in principle
broader powers of self-governance in areas including religion and provincial
legislation. This made it possible to develop more vigorous Sharī’a regulations
by allowing the local legislative assem bly to move forward with working
out the details of new legislation (qanun), including those defining the new
institutions by which Islamic law would be implemented.2 Aceh’s current
Sharī’a bureaucracy comprises a number of distinct but interrelated bodies.
In this system, the State Sharī’a Agency ( Dinas Syariat Islam/DSI) performs
coordinating functions in working with the other major institutions involved
with the implementation of Islamic law in contemporary Aceh: the Sharī’a
Courts (Mahkamah Syariah/MS), the Ulama Council (Majlis Permusyawaratan
Ulama/MPU), the ‘Sharīa Police’ (Wilayatul Hisbah/WH).3
The substantive legislation of Islamic law in Aceh is contained in regional
regulations referred to locally as ‘qanun’.4 Aside from two qanuns dealing
with the formation of specific Sharī’a institutions,5 the first of these new
laws passed was Qanun No. 11/2002, which marked a new level of symbolic
state engagement with the particulars of Islamic belief and practice. In terms
of formal law enforcement, however, the most significant Acehnese qanuns
gapore, 469A Tower Block, ‘10-01, Bukit Timah Road, Singapore, 259770. E-mail: arifm@nus.
edu.sg

* I have presented earlier versions of this essay at workshops and seminars at Columbia University
(New York), Institut d’études de l’Islam et des sociétés du monde Musulman (Paris), Universitas Al Muslim
(Bireuen, Aceh), Universitas Malikussaleh, and STAIN (both in Lhokseumawe, Aceh) and I have benefitted much from the comments of colleagues in these discussions. I would also like to thank Merle Ricklefs,
Chaider Bamualim, Mahdi Syihab, Mark Cammack, Barry Hooker, Jeremy Kingsley, David Powers, and the
anony mous reviewers of this journal for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. My thanksalso to
Hongyan Li for her help with formatting the manuscript for publication. Research for this project was undertaken with the support of a grant from the Singapore Ministry of Education’s Academic Research Fund
(MOE AcRF ‘R-110-000-029-750)
1
For a brief background on legal and administrative reform in the post-Suharto period, see Tim
Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, “ e Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal
Systems and Change in Indonesia,” in Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd edition, ed. Tim Lindsey (Annandale,
Australia: Federation Press, 2008), 11 -22. For the broader social and political contexts of Indonesian ‘Reformasi’, see Kees van Dijk, ACountry in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000 (Leiden: KITLV Press,
2001), 289-321.
2
On the political contexts surrounding the initial implementation of Islamic law in contemporary Aceh, see further the chapters by Moch. Nur Ichwan and Tim Lindsey, M.B. Hooker, Ross Clarke, and
Jeremy Kingsley in Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia:Ideas and Institutions, ed. R. Michael Feener
and Mark E. Cammack (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 2007), 193-254, and Michelle Miller and R.
Michael Feener, “Emergency and Islamic Law in Aceh,” in Law and Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the
Limits ofLegality, ed. Victor Ramraj and Arun iruvengadam (Cambridge University Press, 2010),213-36.
3
Each of these institutions is discussed in detail in my forthcoming book, Sharī”a as SocialEngineering: e Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia.
4
The standard published source for legislation on the implementation of Islamic law in contemporary Aceh is Himpunan Undang-undang, Keputusan Presiden, Peraturan Daerah/Qanun, Instruksi
Gubernur dan Edaran Gubernur berkaitan Pelaksanaan Syari”at Islam, EdisiKetujuh (Banda Aceh: Dinas
Syari’at Islam Aceh, 2009).
5
Peraturan Daerah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam No. 33/2001 tentang Susunan Organisasi dan Tata Kerja Dinas Syariat Islam; and Qanun Provinsi Nanggroe Darussalam No. 10/2002 tentang
Peradilan Syariat Islam. This explanation of the term is borrowed from William Roﬀ’s work on similar
regulations of Islamic morality in the Malay Peninsula. See his “Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s1990s: Exemplars, Institutions and Vectors,” Studies of Islam and Society in SoutheastAsia (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2009), 98.
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have been three laws passed in 2003: No. 12 on the consumption of alcohol,
No. 13 on gambling, and No. 14 on khalwat (“improper covert association”
between members of the opposite sex).6 As the only substantive statements
on the content of Sharīa to be applied in Aceh to date, these have been the
focus of most of the new activities of the Sharī’a Courts and the other new,
or newly reformulated, institutions of Islamic law there.6 Within this rather
limited range of Sharī’a ‘criminal’ offenses (jinayat), however, cases involving
gambling, alcohol consumption and khalwat have never, to date, amounted to
a significant portion of the Mahkamah Syariah’s caseload. Across Aceh, there
has been a sharp decrease in the number of cases involving qanuns No. 12, No.
13, and No. 14 since numbers peaked in 2005-2006.7
The operationalization of many parts of Aceh’s contemporary Islamic
legal system has been hampered by various physical, political, and social
constraints. Thus despite the establishment of a number of institutions
dedicated to the application of Sharī’a as positive law, the impact of their
work in the actual implementation of law in the province has been minimal.
What then, are we to make of a legal system that does not actually do very
much law in the formal sense? I argue that the architects and institutional
agents of Aceh’s contemporary Sharī’a system have increasingly directed
their attention and resources away from the promulgation of new legislation
and the prosecution of cases and toward strategies for the more informal
‘socialization’ of a particular set of Islamic values. Their approach has thus
been to work toward a more fundamental transformation of Acehnese society
that extends well beyond blackletter law and the state institutions of the
formal legal sphere. In this, we find a situation in which the legal program of
state Sharī’a implementation has been subsumed within a broader array of
movements for reforming society in accordance with Islamic norms. This has
resulted in a significant blurring of any clear distinction between the spheres
of Islamic law and da”wa. Here the power of legal institutions is brought to
bear less on the application of positive law than it is to provide state support
for programs of religious and social reconstruction.
III.Building a ‘New Aceh’

The massive destruction wrought by the 2004 tsunami leveled many
existing structures, both physical and organizational.8 At the same time it
opened up space for rebuilding Acehnese society from the ground up, and this
in turn established the highly charged context in which the implementation of
Aceh’s contemporary Islamic legal system took place. 9 This work was greatly
the courts have had far fewer cases related to the subsequent Qanun No. 7/2004 on Zakat.
It should also be noted that over the years the number of cases prosecuted in each of Aceh’s
twenty-four first-instance Islamic courts has varied widely from district to district, and that even during the
peak years immediately following the tsunami the overwhelming majority of them never handled double
digit criminal caseloads. ‘Rekapitulasi Pelanggaran Qanun Jinayah dengan Hukuman Cambuk sejak tahun
2004 s/d 2010 oleh Mahkamah Syari’ah se-Wilayah Aceh,” statistics compiled by Khudaini (Mahkhamah
Syari’iyah Kabupaten Aceh Besar, Jantho), April 2011.
8
The M9.2 earthquake on December 26, 2004 caused a tsunami that struck the coast of Aceh,
leaving over 122,000 dead or missing and displacing over 700,000 survivors. For more on the extent of
physical destruction, see Consultative Group on Indonesia, Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment: e
December 26, 2004 Natural Disaster (Jakarta:BAPPENAS, 2005).
9
On the reconstruction and peace processes in Aceh, see Patrick Daly, R. Michael Feener, and
6
7
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facilitated by the fact that the natural disaster and international responses
to it catalyzed and accelerated efforts toward settlement of a peace accord
that ended the decades long violent conflict between GAM (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka/“Free Aceh Movement”) and the central Indonesian government.10
The newly established peace also allowed governments and a host of diverse
non-governmental organizations to pursue their own projects of relief,
rehabilitation and development largely undisturbed by the kinds of violence
that previously had made such interventions nearly impossible in Aceh.11 In
doing so, it also allowed for the entry of large numbers of foreign aid workers
who brought with them a wide range of ideas on reconstruction in addition to
immediate disaster relief. 12
Although the efforts of international aid programs were diverse in many
ways, they generally shared a broader discursive framework that emphasized
goals of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in response to
the disaster. This rhetoric of transformation builds upon global discourses of
developmentalism promoted by government agencies and organizations like the
World Bank. A defining trope of this vision of disaster relief and recovery is an
emphasis on the importance of going beyond immediate post disaster recovery
and using the opportunity to develop infrastructure, and to develop new modes
of good governance that emphasize capacity building and sustainability. 13
To coordinate the vast and diverse reconstruction efforts of international
aid projects, and to facilitate links between relief, rehabilitation and development
in response to the disaster, the Indonesian government established a special,
ministry level body known as the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
for Aceh and Nias (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi/BRR) . 14 The BRR was
given a fixed, four year mandate of operations by the Indonesian government,
and a symbolic charge by former US President Bill Clinton (in his capacity as
the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery), to “build back better.”15 This
included not only the physical reconstruction of disaster affected areas, but
also efforts to implement new models of quality assurance, transparency, good
Anthony Reid, ed., From the Ground Up: Perspectives on Post Tsunami and Post ConflictAceh (Singapore:
ISEAS Press, 2011).
10
Earlier attempts at resolving the conflict were plagued by diﬃculties. See Edward Aspinall and
Harold A. Crouch, “ e Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed,” East-West CenterPolicy Studies (Washington, D.C.:
East-West Center, 2003); Michelle Ann Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta’s Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh (London: Routledge,2009). Diverse aspects of the peace process that culminated
in the 2005 Helsinki agreement are presented in the papers published in Aguswandi and Judith Large, ed.,
ReconfiguringPolitics: e Indonesia-Aceh Peace Process—a special issue of Accord: An International Review
of Peace Initiatives 20 (2008). For a critical review of the longer process, see Ed Aspinall, Islam and Nation:
Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009),220-47.
11
Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) and International Partners, Aceh and NiasOne Year
after the Tsunami: e Recovery Eﬀort and Way Forward (Banda Aceh: BRR NAD-Nias, 2005), 14-5, 116-7.
12
J. Telford, J. Cosgrove, and R. Houghton, Joint Evaluation of the International Responseto the
Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report (London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition,2006).
13
See, for example: Multi Donor Fund, Implementing Projects, Achieving Results: 18 Monthsof
the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias—Progress Report III (Jakarta: 2006).
14
The BRR was formally established on April 16, 2005 “as a coordinating agency to ensure transparency, accountability, and speed in the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias.” BRR FactSheet (Ref. 1003/10/3/
BRRFactSheet-E.doc).
15
Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) and International Partners, Aceh and Nias:Two
Years after the Tsunami: 2006 Progress Report (Banda Aceh: BRR NAD-Nias, 2006),iii.
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governance, and gender equity in post tsunami Aceh.16 In fact, of the originally
proposed multi billion dollar reconstruction budget, only half was directly
allocated for humanitarian relief and reconstruction of facilities destroyed by
the earthquake and tsunami. The remainder was budgeted “to address long
standing problems and for building a better Aceh” (emphasis in original).17
Since 2005, this rhetoric of radical reconstruction spread across Aceh,
far beyond the coastal areas affected by the tsunami. The BRR’s reports and
literature went so far as to proclaim: “The tsunami proved to be a blessing
in disguise for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. It transformed this westernmost
province of Indonesia. Not just physically either…” 18 Combined with the
euphoric discourses surrounding the dawn of a new peace in a region long
plagued by violent conflict, there emerged a pervasive sense of the possibility
of creating a ‘new Aceh’ that would transform the lives of a people who had
suffered so much war and devastation.
What this new and improved Aceh might look like, however, was a
subject of extensive debate in an energized public sphere. With the ending of
armed conflict, Aceh, for the first time, was able to enjoy the new freedoms
of post Suharto Indonesia. This allowed local newspapers, magazines and
broadcast media to flourish, and facilitated the emergence of hotly contested
debates on a wide range of social, legal, and political issues.19 At the same time,
the great influx of NGOs and foreign aid organizations into post conflict, post
tsunami Aceh brought new perspectives and voices to these conversations—
often emphasizing concerns central to their own views on how restoring
livelihoods and economic development could contribute to the promotion
of broader social improvements toward human rights, gender justice and
democratization.20 Their ideas were vigorously promoted not only through
publications, but also through thousands of outreach sessions, focus group
discussions, seminars and workshops that cluttered the calendar of events in
Aceh for most of 2005-2009. Through such programs, increasing numbers of
Acehnese became engaged with debates over new ideas about peace, human
rights, gender justice, democracy and economic development. In many cases,
these discussions also engaged with the implications of these ideas for local
understandings of Islam.

Aceh and Nias: 2006 Progress Report, 84-8.
World Bank, Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Preliminary Stocktaking of theReconstruction
Eﬀort Six Months After the Earthquake and Tsunami (Jakarta: 2005), xv. einitial projections and plans for
the allocation of reconstruction aid funds were, of course, reworked as priorities shifted. For an account of
the handling of these funds up until the end of the BRR’s mandate in 2009, see BRR, Finance: e Seven Keys
to Eﬀective AidManagement (Jakarta: Multi Donor Fund/UNDP, 2009).
18
BRR, Tsunami: From Disaster to the Emergence of Light (Jakarta: Multi Donor Fund/ UNDP,
2009), 95.
19
R. Michael Feener, “Hand, Heart and Handphone: State Sharī’a in the Age of the SMS,” (forthcoming).
20
The immense amount of funding available for reconstruction in post tsunami Aceh created an
unprecedented opportunity for various aid organizations to implement and test theories about disaster
mitigation and vulnerability that they had been developing since the 1990s. ese developments are discussed further in Patrick Daly, Zero Hour: Post disasterRecovery and Reconstruction (forthcoming).
16
17
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IV. Post Tsunami Religious Revival
Concurrent with these burgeoning discussions in NGO circles was a
broad surge of religious revival in post tsunami Aceh. In an initial mapping
of Acehnese interpretations of the earthquake and tsunami, it was noted that
while some saw them as purely natural disasters, many Acehnese understood
the tragedy as originating from God, either as divine retribution for the sins
of the people, a test of their faith, or something preordained.21 Published
collections of tsunami survivor narratives contain numerous accounts
framed in expressly religious terms, with frequent references to the ways in
which mosques—often the only buildings to survive the shocks of quake and
wave22 —provided shelter and salvation for those fleeing the disaster.23 At
the same time, official publications from the Acehnese provincial government
elaborate upon what were perceived to be God’s meaning and purpose behind
such disasters, including: (1) to raise the quality of religious faith, (2) an
opportunity for those struck by tragedy to gain religious merit, (3) a means of
having one’s sins forgiven, (4) an occasion for God to grant mercy to those who
are patient and accepting of fate, and, (5) a divine test to determine who truly
has faith—“like gold that is tested by fire to separate the pure from the false.”24
Religious dimensions of social change were energetically engaged by
the state and other major players behind the transformations of post tsunami
Aceh. In this way, the reconstruction efforts gave supporters of the Sharī’a
program new momentum with which to restart stalled measures for the
implementation of Islamic law in the province. This new refocusing on religion
as a major component of social change was supported by the Indonesian
government at the highest levels. For example, the Consultative Group on
Indonesia—composed of leaders from the Indonesian National Planning
Development Agency (BAPPENAS), the World Bank, and the international
donor committee— designated “Supporting Religion and Culture” as a major
rubric for reconstruction efforts in the immediate wake of the tsunami.25 The
BRR went even further in actively encouraging transformation in the religious
and cultural life of post tsunami Aceh: the risks were too great for BRR to focus
merely on rebuilding damaged houses and infrastructure. e agency also needed
to facilitate social transformation, and therefore geared all its programs and
activities toward achieving social reconstruction… To achieve the above, BRR,
in particular the Deputy for Religious, Social and Cultural Aﬀairs, coordinated,
developed and promoted cross sectoral activities to strengthen and renew the
21
Julianto Saleh, “Pemaknaan Kejadian Tsunami dan Perilaku Keberagamaan Masyarakat Pasca
Tsunami” (Banda Aceh: Pusat Latihan Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, 2005).
22
According to more worldly explanations for the survival of mosques amid the destruction of
other buildings, the open design and/or more solid materials used in mosque construction accounted for
their survival while surrounding neighborhoods were levelled by the wave.
23
See, for example, Damanhuri bin Abbas et al., Tsunami dan Kisah Mereka (Banda Aceh: Badan
Arsip Provinisi NAD, 2006); Sri Widodo and Ikhwan Nursyujoko, ed., 99 TanganTuhan di Aceh: Misteri dan
Keajaiban di Balik Tsunami (Jakarta: Yayasan Air Mata, 2005).
24
Teuku Abdullah Sanny, ed., Tsunami Aceh (Banda Aceh: Pemerintah Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam, 2008), 157-63. On religious interpretations of the tsunami in Aceh, see Edwin Wieringa, “God
Speaks through Natural Disasters, but What Does he Say?: Islamic interpretations in Indonesian Tsunami
Poetry,” in Aceh History, Politics and Culture, ed. Arndt Graf, Susanne Schröter, and Edwin Wieringa (Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2010), 316-33.
25
Consultative Group on Indonesia, Notes on Reconstruction: e December 26, 2004Natural Disaster (Jakarta: BAPPENAS, 2005), 45-53.
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spiritual and social life of the people.26
The Indonesian Government’s initial ‘Master Plan’ also identified specific
policy strategies for addressing religious aspects of the reconstruction of post
tsunami Aceh, with particular focus on religious education, the recruitment
and training of religious officials, the construction of mosques and offices for
state religious bureaucracies, and fostering ‘spiritual tranquility recovery’.27
These projects for religious reconstruction had the effect of bringing Islamic
institutions and leadership further into the orbit of the Indonesian state in
complex ways. Through these newly strengthened connections, the ulamā’
were engaged and employed as the means by which to promote a new social
vision of Islam in Aceh. For example, a workshop for female “ulamā hosted
at Banda Aceh’s most luxurious new hotel in June 2007 recommended, inter
alia , that “theulamāmust be resolute toward the government onthe issue
of Sharī’a implementation and more pro active in society in promoting the
understanding of Islamic law as a complete and total system (syar”at Islam
secara kaffah).”28
On one level, such appeals to Islamic law, and the role of the state
in implementing its social vision echo the broad appeal of Sharī’a as an
abstract, ideal vision of justice and social order increasingly popular across
Muslim Indonesia over the past decade. Indeed, to a significant degree
it may be said that the implementation of Islamic law in Aceh as part of its
‘Special Autonomy’ status has served to bring Acehnese understandings and
practices of Islam more firmly in line with Indonesian national standards than
at any time in its previous history. This has become evident not only in the
convergence of Islamic discourses between Aceh and Jakarta, but also in the
recent proliferation of branches of Indonesian Islamic organizations across the
province. For most of Aceh’s history, the major national Muslim organizations,
including the NU and Muhammadiyah, had little success in Aceh. Since the
peace, however, these and other Indonesian national organizations have
grown in the province. Likewise models of Islamic education developed in Java
and elsewhere in Indonesia have been making inroads in Aceh, including the
influential network of Gontor ‘modern pesantren’ that opened a campus in
Aceh in 2008.29 These developments have been facilitated by the work of the
new and newly reconstituted state Islamic institutions of Aceh’s contemporary
Islamic legal system.
26
BRR, Religion, Social Culture: Revitalizing the Dignity of Society (Jakarta: Multi Donor Fund/
UNDP, 2009), 20.
27
Regulation of the President of Republic of Indonesia Number 30 Year 2005 on Master Plan
for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the Regions and People of the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias Islands of the Province of North Sumatra—Main Book of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
(Jakarta: 2005), IV4.
28
the ‘Forum Silaturrahmi Ulama Perempuan se-Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’ was held at the
Hermes Palace Hotel and sponsored by Mitra Sejati Perempuan Indonesia. See Siti Zalikha Ibrahim, “Santri
Menemukan Jati Diri,” in Menuju Syariat Islam Kaﬀah: Pikirandan Pengalaman Santri Aceh dalam menuntut
Ilmu dan Hubungannya dengan Perbuatan Nyata, ed. Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda (Banda Aceh: Lepena, 2008),
27-80, 74.
29 “Pondok Modern Darul Amin Gontor 10—Meunasah Baro, Seulimeum, Aceh Besar,” Wardun:
Warta Dunia Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor 61 (Sha’bān 1429): 98-100.
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V. Constructing a New ‘Sharīa System’
Beyond the integration of Acehnese Islam into broader Indonesian
national standards, state projects for the implementation of Sharī’a in Aceh
have been seen as useful for building a bulwark against the kind of NGO-style
‘globalization’ that was feared by both Acehnese “ulamā and the Indonesian
central government. Jakarta based Islamist activists and conspiracy theorists
actively promoted the idea that post tsunami reconstruction programs had
opened the floodgates for Christian missionaries and Zionist agents attempting
to turn the Acehnese away from the true path of Islam.30 At the same time
within Aceh itself, Muslim intellectuals from the State Institute of Islamic
Studies (IAIN) were working to develop new strategies to counter what some
there perceived to be a threat of invasion by anti Islamic forces from the West.
Their efforts included the development of new da’wa media and education
programs to instill their vision of proper Islamic morality upon the populace.
31
Other governmental institutions also mobilized in the name of Sharī’a as a
response to perceived foreign corruption in more physically assertive ways.33
Sharī’a was seen as having the potential both to protect Aceh and to facilitate
its integration into Indonesian national culture, including its own particular
experiences of Islamic revival. The state’s coercive apparatus put into place
in service of the Sharī’a was used not only as a counter to the deleterious
cultural effects of globalization, but also to steer social development in desired
directions.
Like the BRR, the World Bank, and other stakeholders in Aceh’s post
tsunami reconstruction, the ideological supporters of the new Sharī’a system
saw tremendous opportunities to transform society in the wake of the great
wave. The vision of the main architects of this system has been a thoroughly
forward looking one, and the first head of the State Sharī’a Agency, Al Yasa
Abubakar, made a point of repeatedly arguing that “Acehnese society does
not want, and will not try, to turn back the clock.”32 Rather, the ideology of
many advocates of Sharī’a implementation in contemporary Aceh is one with
a vision of future oriented social transformation, insisting on the need to move
beyond ‘traditional’ understandings toward a vision of Islam that actively
engages with modern developments in fields including education, economics
and medicine.33 The goal is to use the new Islamic legal system to bring about
sweeping social change in both the regulation of society and the character of
individual Muslims to conform to a particular set of modern ideals. Al Yasa
himself lists first among his expressed goals of Sharī’a implementation in Aceh
30
See, for example, Rizki Ridyasmara, Gerilya Salib di Serambi Mekkah: Dari ZamanPortugis
Hingga Paska Tsunami (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2006).
31
Muhammad A.R., Potret Aceh Pasca Tsunami: Mengintip Peran Dayah dalam MenghadapiAkulturasi Akhlak (Aceh: Ar-Raniry Press, 2007), 83-114. For example, in August, 2006 the Sharī’a police (WH)
forced their way into the UN compound in Banda Aceh and attempted to inspect staﬀ bedrooms there. Fadlullah Wilmot, “Sharīah in Aceh: Panacea or Blight?” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives20
(2008): 77-8.
32
Al Yasa Abubakar, Syari”at Islam di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam: Paradigma,Kebijakan,
dan Kegiatan (Banda Aceh: Dinas Syariat Islam NAD, 2008), 81. Indeed evenwhen at times the past glories
of the Acehnese sultanate during its seventeenth-century ‘golden age’ are rhetorically evoked, it is clear
that returning to a pre-modern model of Islamic law is not the primary motivation of the majority of people
involved with the current experiment in establishing a Sharī’a system in Aceh.
33 ibid., 25.
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that of improving and perfecting the Islam of individual Muslims, arguing that
if this is accomplished, the Acehnese as a whole will become more “honest,
frugal, studious, diligent, loyal, intelligent, and emotionally mature.”34
The model of Muslim revivalist ideology that animates contemporary
agendas of Sharī’a implementation in Aceh is one that not only reflects,
but in some sense actually prefigures, broader Indonesian national trends
of Islamization over the past four decades. These developments are often
subsumed under the general rubric of da’wa. The first college Faculty of
Da’wa established anywhere in Indonesia was at the State Institute for Islamic
Studies (IAIN) at Banda Aceh in 1964.35 This innovation in Islamic higher
education was vigorously promoted by Aceh’s former governor, Ali Hasjmy
(d. 1998), who played a key role in promoting this vision of Islam as a means
of reconciling local concerns for religious identity with the political and
economic agendas of the Indonesian nation state.36 Elsewhere in Indonesia,
the da’wa movement was accelerated through the activities of campus based
Islamist organizations, the most prominent of which was the Salman Mosque
Movement on the campus of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) .37
Its aim was to implant reformed ‘Islamic values’ into the developing minds
of future Indonesian technocrats by transforming individuals through the
careful regulation of ritual practice, personal morality, and the promotion of
Islamic public symbols of Islam, including in many cases the adoption of forms
of ‘Islamic dress’ such as the head scarf ( jilbab) for women.38
Although the students associated with the Salman Mosque movement
looked broadly to contemporary developments in the Middle East for
inspiration, particularly prominent influence came from neo Ikhwani forms
of activism that developed during the 1970s. 39 This largely depoliticized
emphasis on reinvigorating Islam as a system of personalized devotionalism
and public moralism was, nonetheless, embedded within a totalizing vision
of Islam as a systematized way of life.40 By the end of the twentieth century,
34 ibid., 81-5.
35
Risalah Fakultas Dakwah dan Publisistik I.A.I.N Djami’ah Ar-Raniry Darussalam (BandaAceh:
Bahagian Publikasi Fakultas Dakwah/Publisistik Darussalam, 1969), 18.
36
Hasjmy produced countless public statements on this modern vision of da’wa, ranging from
book-length publications to public addresses. See, for example: A. Hasjmy, DusturDa’wa Menurut Al Qurän
(Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1974); “Peranan Da’wa Islamiyah dalamPembangunan Masyarakat Desa,” speech
read at an Aceh Ulama Council workshop held at Banda Aceh on 13 December, 1977 (Collection of the Ali
Hasjmy Foundation Library, Banda Aceh). On the broader nexus between da’wa and developmentalism
in Indonesia under Suharto’s New Order, see R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal ought in ModernIndonesia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 103-9.
37
“Gerakan Kaum Muda Islam Mesjid Salman,” in Gerakan Islam Kontemporer diIndonesia, ed.
Abdul Aziz, Imam olkhah, and Soetarman S. (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus,1989). See also Chaider S. Bamualim,
Islamization and Resistance: A Study of Religions, Stateand Society in Western Java c. 1965 (forthcoming).
38
A compilation of influential sermons delivered at ITB’s Salman Mosque stresses these points.
On these, see Muhammad Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, Kuliah Tauhid (Bandung: Pustaka-Perpustakaan
Salman ITB, 1980), 117-29, et passim.
39
Following the strong measures of the Egyptian government to suppress the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) in the 1950s and 1960s, a new model of social engagement emerged from the
movement, emphasizing education and da”wa, rather than direct contestation over control of the state. See
Meir Hatina, “Restoring a Lost Identity: Models of Education in Modern Islamic Thought,” British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies33:2 (2006): 182-4; Barbara H.E. Zollner, e Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi
andIdeology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
40
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such visions of Islam as a totalizing system (nizam ) came to be increasingly
described by the phrase ‘Islam yang kaffah.’ This same phrase has emerged
as a prominent trope in Islamist discourses in Aceh, where it was integrated
into official government publications and the language of the legislation that
established the province’s new Islamic legal system. 41
The degree to which the transformation of visions of Islam in Aceh has
been linked to broader Indonesian national trends is explicitly emphasized
in the official text of the ‘Clarification’ (Penjelasan) of Qanun 11/2002.42
There it is asserted that, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, unprecedented
possibilities were opened for the application of Islamic law in the country.
Governmental decentralization policies introduced at that time facilitated
the promulgation of ‘Sharīa based’ regional laws (perda syariat) by dozens
of local governments across the archipelago.43 In Aceh, however, moves in
this direction were allowed to proceed further than anywhere else after the
province was granted the authority to formally implement Islamic law by Law
No. 44/1999 on the ‘Special Status of the Province of Aceh Special Region’.
The provincial government of Aceh enthusiastically took to this new
authority over the administration of religion in its 2001 five year plan for
Aceh, which pronounced as its primary aim the da’wa ideal of creating a
society based on Islam in which the Sharī’a would be applied in its totality
(secara kaffah) across all aspects of social life.44 However during the first
five years of Aceh’s special autonomy very little was accomplished in terms
of the formal implementation of Islamic law in the province. The situation
began to change dramatically in the wake of the December 2004 tsunami,
at which time a heightened level of religious enthusiasm, combined with a
new sense of rebuilding Aceh, empowered the expansion and development of
the Islamic legal system. Over the years that followed, Muslim intellectuals in
Aceh were generally eager to recognize and reinforce the government’s use of
the institutional structures of state Sharī’a to promote social transformation.
As a prominent lecturer in the philosophy of law at Banda Aceh’s IAIN has
emphatically expressed it, “The Sharī’a must be systematized to order every
action of a Muslim’s life... There is not a single dimension of Muslim life that can
escape being ordered by the Shar ī’a.”45 In this totalizing rhetoric, Sharī’a has
come increasingly to serve as the idiom in which sweeping transformations of
Acehnese society are elaborated.
Youth in Bandung, Indonesia (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2007),17.
41
I have described the ideological genealogies of these discourses more extensively in: “‘Syiar
Islam’ in Contemporary Aceh,” paper presented at the European Association for Southeast Asian Studies
Conference (Naples, September 2007).
42
“Penjelasan atas Qanun Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Nomor 11 Tahun 2002 tentang
Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam Bidang Aqidah, Ibadah, dan Syi’ar Islam,” HimpunanPeraturan Perundang Undangan tentang Mahkamah Syar”iyah di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Banda Aceh: Mahkamah
Syar’iyah Propinsi NAD, 2006), 201-9.
43 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” in Expressing
Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 174-91.
44
Al Yasa Abubakar, “Rencana Strategis Provinsi NAD Tahun 2001-2005,” in BungaRampai Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam: Pendukung Qanun Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam, (BandaAceh: Dinas Syariat Islam Aceh,
2009), 20.
45
Syahrizal, “Strategi Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam,” in SuaraKhatib
Baiturrahman, ed. Azman Ismail (Banda Aceh: Pengurus Masjid Raya Baiturrahman,2006), 21.
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VI. ‘Living Law’

The work of developing and promoting the Islamization of law in Aceh
was to a great extent carried out by academics at the National Institute for
Islamic Studies (IAIN) campus in Banda Aceh. Many of the most prominent
figures involved in these developments were also graduates of al -Azhar, where
they had been exposed to neo-Ikhwani understandings of Islamic law and the
religious dimensions of social change as expressed in works like al-Hu(aybī’s
Du”āt lāQu’āt.46 In their later careers back in Aceh, their work of recasting
such visions of Islamic law to bring them more in line with both Indonesian
discourses about law as a tool of development, and the international rhetoric
of post disaster recovery, demonstrates the dramatic ways in which discourses
on law and society in Indonesia have changed over the past half century. At the
same time, I would argue, it also signals the need to pay careful attention to the
complex impact that non-Muslim discourses on law and social development
may have on contemporary formulations and interpretations of Sharī’a.
For example, Syahrizal has urged the Acehnese to seize the opportunity
that had been provided by the ‘Special Autonomy’ laws to “establish Islamic
law as the ‘living law’ in Aceh.”47 This particular form for expressing the desired
goal of the new Islamic legal system engages with some of the most central
aspects of legal thought debated among Indonesian jurists since the founding
of the independent nation in 1945. In particular it reflects the major shift in
emphasis from understandings of law as a reflection of empirical social fact to
law as a system for the normative prescription of ideal values.
‘Living law’ has long been the main rubric under which the Indonesian
state has effected significant changes to the legal culture of the nation. In the
early years of independence, mapping ‘the living law’ of the country came to
define the primary battleground for those arguing diverse positions across an
increasingly wide gap between proponents of adat and proponents of Islam
as sources for national law.48 The centrality of the concept of ‘living law’ in
Indonesian legal thought had its origins in the field of adat (customary law)
studies in the Dutch colonial period. The early development of the field of
adat law and its rise to prominence in discourses on law and administration
in the Netherlands East Indies were driven by the work of Cornelius van
Vollenhoven.49 In elaborating his influential model of adat law, van Vollenhoven
developed conceptions of ‘living law’ and legal pluralism that in many ways
paralleled those of his Austrian contemporary Eugen Ehrlich, who summed
up his Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts on the sociology of law with the
46
For example, Al Yasa Abubakar, the founding director of Aceh’s State Sharī’a Agency (Dinas
Syariat Islam) has taken a master’s degree in u(ūl al-fiqh from al-Azhar in 1980, and Muslim Ibrahim, Head
of Aceh’s Ulama Council (Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama), spent over a decade at al-Azhar as well (19731984), taking graduate degrees in tarbiya and fiqh.
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Syahrizal, ed., Kontekstualisasi Syari”at Islam di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Banda Aceh: ArRaniry Press, 2003), xvi.
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Ratno Lukito, “Law and Politics in Post-Independence Indonesia: A Case Study of Religious and
Adat Courts,” in Sharī”a and Politics in Modern Indonesia, ed. Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Press, 2003), 21.
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On these developments, see further Roy Ellen, “ e Development of Anthropology and Colonial
Policy in the Netherlands: 1800-1960,” Journal of the History of the BehavioralSciences 12 (1976): 303-24;
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J. Burns, e Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Lawin Indonesia (Jakarta: PT Pradnya Paramita, 1999), 246-54.
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sentence, “At the present as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of
legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial
decision, but in society itself.” 50 Ehrlich is commonly regarded as a founding
figure in the sociology of law for his attempts at recasting the scope within
which jurists work to include broader considerations—calling for lawyers to
be trained in sociology, economics and even psychology in addition to their
legal studies.51 As will be discussed below, such an expansive view of the
social dimension of legal change is something that is frequently echoed in the
writings and everyday language of many of those directly involved with the
design and operation of Aceh’s Islamic legal system.
VII. Legal Instrumentalism and The Technocrats

Over the course of its long career and development out of Dutch adat law
discussions, the Indonesian concept of ‘living law’ (Ind. hukumyang hidup)
mutated in terms of its relative emphasis: from ethnographic description
to ideological prescription. Adat law came to play a powerful symbolic role
in the Indonesian nationalist movement, and as such was integrated into
the modernizing reform projects of Dutch trained scholars like R. Soepomo,
who was an influential figure in the drafting of independent Indonesia’s first
Constitution.52 In the process, the nostalgic idealism of ‘custom’ faded under
the glare of various shades of revolutionary romanticism. As the von BendaBeckmanns have recently summarized these developments, “Living law here
functioned as a legitimation of a kind of Freie Rechtslehre” in a way that
became clearly contrary to the visions of ‘living law’ advanced by van Vollenhoven and Ehrlich.53
These changes were deeply lamented by latter day exponents of clas
sical adat law, including Mohamad Koesnoe, 54 who argued that the foundation
of the 1945 constitution—as outlined in the preamble— was fundamentally
a ‘metaphysical’ conception of law manifest in ‘nor mative principles.’ 55 The
50
Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), xv.
51
Baudouin Dupret has compared Ehrlich’s approach to that of Malinowski, with a shared emphasis on the ways in which cultural ideals govern human interaction to produce a ‘law’ that reflects norms
of social control: Baudouin Dupret, “What is Plural in the Law? A Praxiological Answer,” Égypte/Monde
arabe, Troisième série, 1 (2005). http://ema.revues. org/index1869.html. Accessed November 4, 2010. e
followers of van Vollenhoven, however, proved increasingly more amenable to lending their work on aspects of Indonesian society to the service of the courts and various branches of governmental administration. See Raymond Kennedy, “Applied Anthropology in the Dutch East Indies,” Transactions of the New York
Academy of Sciences Series 2.6 (1944): 157-62. For more on Ehrlich in relationto Dutch and Indonesian
formulations of living law, see Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, “ e Social Life of Living Law in Indonesia,” in Living Law: ReconsideringEugen Ehrlich, ed. Marc Hertogh (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).
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Ab Massier, e Voice of the Law in Transition: Indonesian Jurists and their Languages,1915-2000
(Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), 151.
53 von Benda-Beckmann, “ e Social Life of Living Law in Indonesia,” 187.
54
Moh. Koesnoe, “Mengamati Konsep Hukum di Dalam Masyarakat Kita,” in KapitaSelekta Hukum Adat: Suatu Pemikiran Baru, ed. M. Ali Boediarto (Jakarta: Varia Peradilan—Ikatan Hakim Indonesia,
2002), 53-82.
55
In his discussion, Koesnoe references the work of Roscoe Pound on law as a ‘tool of social engineering’—something that he sees as facilitating the further deterioration of law to the point that “it functions as a political manifesto by the powers that promulgated it.” Koesnoe, “Mengamati Konsep Hukum,”
58-71.
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movement away from this idealist toward a more instrumentalist vision
of law over subsequent decades of Indone sian history was, in his view, a
reflection of the influence of Marxist legal theory upon Soekarno’s left-leaning
government.56 Even after the collapse of the regime in 1965, however, basic
understandings of law in instrumentalist terms persisted and found new
forms of expression from the New Order Indonesian state. In 1973 they re
emerged in theMain Outlines of National Direction (GBHN) under the new
idiom of‘law as a tool [for national development],’ which Koesnoe glossed as
“law as an instrument to facilitate the advance of political objectives.”57 By this
point, law was no longer a descriptive reflection of the actual norms active in
society, as professed by earlier proponents of adat law. Rather, law had come
to be viewed as a means by which to define the ideals toward which society
should be aspiring. This fundamental shift from description to prescription
in dominant Indonesian philosophies of law allowed the state to legitimize
its various agendas of restructuring and reform in a wide number of areas,
including the articulation of official understandings of Islamic law as ‘living
fiqh,’ as John Bowen has noted in relation to the 1991 Indonesian Compilation
of IslamicLaws. 58
Over the course of the New Order period (1965-1998), the Indo nesian
government instituted an entire range of policies in which par ticular forms of
Islamic law were pressed into the service of state projects for modernization
and economic development. These programs were pursued across the full
spectrum of Islamic orientations and insti tutions, but particular efforts were
made to engage with the formal structures of rural pesantren and village
leadership. These structures were mobilized and prominent “ulamā were
recruited to produce Islamic justifications for government initiatives in what
proved to be a very successful promotion of Indonesia’s family planning
program in the 1970s. 59
While such piecemeal reforms were accommodated to traditionalist
Muslim social structures of authority, Islamic modernists and revivalists
were open to ideas of even more comprehensive social transformation. The
modern idea of Islamic law as a totalizing system had been known in Aceh
since the mid twentieth century and was promoted by the leader of the Darul
Islam insurgency. As early as 1962, Daud Beureueh used the term nizam in the
sense of “rules that can order human life on all levels—individual, communal,
societal, and governmental, as well as in international relations.” 60 This grand
56
Koesnoe, “Mengamati Konsep Hukum,” 70. In particular there is a clear aversion to the ‘legal
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extraordinary state action… if the conscious plan for reshaping society so demanded.” Peter C. Caldwell,
Dictatorship, State Planning, and Social eory inthe German Democratic Republic (Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 61.
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(Cambridge, 2003), 190-2. For more on these developments, see Moch. NurIchwan, Oﬃcial Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs inContemporary Indonesia, 1966-2004 (Leiden University dissertation, 2006), 127-35.
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goal was never realized under the Acehnese movement for the establishment
of an Islamic state. Fol lowing the defeat of the Darul Islam in the 1960s,
however, the Indo nesian government came to appeal to Islamic norms to help
promote its own range of development programs in Aceh.
The Indonesian administration of Aceh in the post-Darul Islam period
was dominated by the modernizing agendas of economists and other secular
trained experts who have come to be collectively referred to as “technocrats.”
In the 1970s, John McDougal characterized their “ideology of modernity” as
“mental enlightenment via material progress.” 61 Stuart Schlegel has described
the situation as that of a tech nocratic civil government pushing for economic
development in Banda Aceh, surrounded by “a sea of traditional peasant
villagers” in which the ulamā’ remained “the major rural political force.” 62
These two worlds, moreover, were characterized by very different visions of
mod ern social change:
Development for the government oﬃcials and the academics means that
technocratic advance is the proper course of historical change. What a mod
ernist modern Muslim ulama [sic] means by development is something quite
diﬀerent and he may want no part of economic and secular change. For the
ulama and most village people of all streams, development indeed meanssuch
things as improved medical treatment, but primarily it means better mosques,
a wider literacy in Arabic, and more people familiar with the Koran.63
In his presentation of the ways in which these diverse worlds interacted,
Schlegel presented sketches of two prominent Acehnese technocrats of the
late 1970s: one “typical of modernizing elite figures in most of the world”
at that time—materialist, pragmatist, secularist, and aggressively flouting
religious norms and traditional culture—and the other a ‘pious’ technocrat
who displayed a commitment to normative Islamic belief and practice as
popularly understood in Aceh. He concluded that the predominance of the
latter type of technocrat in Aceh was responsible for “their tentative acceptance
by Acehnese society at large because they share in the public symbols of its
unity.” 64 Schlegel presents these pious technocrats as representative of what
he termed ‘Golkar Islam’ 65 in a way that marks them as a rather curious
exception to broader trends in the 1970s—or so it appeared at the time. With
the advantage of his torical hindsight, however, his remarks seem prescient
as an early man ifestation of a trend that developed significantly over the two
decades that followed—that of increasing numbers of observant Muslims
estab lishing themselves within the structures of the Indonesian state.66
By the 1990s there was clearly an increasing convergence between the
61
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goals and orientations of ‘secular’ and self consciously ‘Islamic’ technocrats in
Indonesia. As early as the 1970s, however, McDougal had noted the penchant of
secular technocrats not only to emphasize the importance of clearly structured
organizations, but also their ‘puri tanical’ anxieties about the perceived
weakening of moral norms in modern society.67 Both of these are characteristics
shared with the class of upwardly mobile Islamic revivalists of more recent
decades. Indeed even the kind of ‘mental and cultural enlightenment’ of the
more secu lar economists and engineers espoused many of the same values
that were later listed by the architects of Aceh’s new Islamic legal system as
desirable outcomes of Sharī’a discipline.68 Both groups thus aimed not only
for the technical implementation of particular developmentalist policies, but
also the cultivation of particular kinds of subjectivities as the foundation for
successful programs of modernization.
VIII. Modern Transformations of Muslim Jurisprudence

At work in all this are new configurations of law, moral authority, and state
power reflecting the global order of modern nations. Such trans formations
of Islamic law are by no means novel to the Acehnese case. Wael Hallaq has
noted that in the classical period the Sharī’a pre supposed and was dependent
upon a ‘moral community’ manifest in myriad informal structures. 69 In the
absence of a sense of moral com munity in the modern period, such a notion
of moral community was replaced with the more systematic and bureaucratic
institutions of the state. Oussama Arabi has commented on the ways in which
the formal ization of Islamic law under Ottoman reforms presented a drastic
shift from a fundamentally religious and theological conception of law to an
instrumentalist, political conception, in which, “to an unprecedented degree,
Sharī’a became a positive tool, a leverage at the service of state interests.” 70
Through these modernizing transformations there has been a marked shift
in the relative emphasis on social maintenance vis-à-vis social engineering in
dominant conceptions of Islamic law.
These developments were facilitated by the ascendance of previously
constrained modes of ‘utilitarian’ reasoning in Islamic Muslim juris prudence.71
Such approaches, framed in particular as they are by radi cally refashioned
conceptions of ‘necessities’ (‘arūriyyāt) and ‘benefit’ (ma(la+a), have assumed
a prominent place in Muslim thought in the modern period under the influence
of Rashīd Ri(ā and other twentieth-century reformists.72 The pervasive
instrumentalism of this mode of modern Islamic reformism makes it eminently
amenable to prescriptive agendas of law as social engineering. This general
tone of instrumentalism in modern fiqh has been easily accommodated with
McDougal, “ e Technocrat’s Ideology of Modernity,” 156-7.
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other trends in non-Muslim jurisprudence that view law as a tool of social
engineering. I would argue that viewing the implementation of Islamic law
in contemporary Aceh as a project for social transforma tion—rather than
merely as a series of reactive measures to the perceived ‘crises of modernity’
and/or political machinations of national and local elites—can provide a new
perspective on why the Sharī’a system has taken its present shape, and the
extent of its accomplishments and failures.
IX. Issues of Eﬃcacy in Implementation

In addressing the issue of the extent to which Islamic law changes
behavior in modern Indonesia, Barry Hooker has proposed the follow ing
standards for assessing their efficacy: (1) that they state criteria by which their
validity can be tested, (2) that they must be capable of effective implementation
by public officials, and (3) that they must extract a basic level of compliance
from the population. In Hooker’s assessment of the situation in 2008, the
Acehnese Qanun had failed these tests.73 It is hard to argue otherwise. Indeed,
on nearly every indicator that one might use to evaluate the success of their
attempts at creating a new legal order, the results are less than impressive.
Well beyond Hooker’s criteria, Aceh’s Sharī’a system appears to have fallen
short on key indices, such as its effectiveness in building new institu tions,
public confidence in the formal apparatus of the legal system, and an actual
impact on crime rates.
Cases involving gambling, alcohol consumption and khalwat have never,
to date, amounted to a significant portion of the caseload of Aceh’s Sharī’ a
Courts. Since 2007, there has been a marked decrease in the number of cases
involving infractions of Sharī’a with regard to sexual morality, gambling and
alcohol brought to court across the prov ince.74 In general, Aceh’s Sharī’a Courts
continue to follow patterns well attested at the national level, and in terms
of their actual day-to-day operation, they appear to be little different from
Islamic Courts in other Indonesian provinces.75 Other offices in Aceh’s Islamic
legal system have likewise little distinguished themselves over recent years.
Given such a performance record in the sphere of formal legal institutions,
there are legitimate questions as to what, exactly, has been accomplished by a
decade of Sharī’a implementation in Aceh.
The project of Sharī’a implementation is frequently characterized as
disappointing by many local proponents of the system itself.76 its apparent
failure to deliver tangible results in the formal legal sphere, Sharī’a nevertheless
remains a defining referent at the center of discus sions on law and society in
Aceh. Here the importance of the project for developments beyond the areas
of legislation and official govern mental institutions becomes clear. As one
prominent Acehnese sup porter of the Sharī’a system has expressed it:
73
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The success of Sharī’ a implementation is not measured solely by the
number of cases decided by the courts or the extent to which the sentences
they pronounce are formally executed. Rather the indication of success should
be found in the decrease of violations of the Sharī’ a, and in the heightened
awareness of the need to uphold the law of God as a protector and as a bearer
of benefits for individuals, families and society. 77
The role of Sharī’a emphasized here as a means of heightening aware
ness (kesadaran) and providing broadly conceived ‘benefit’ (kemasla hatan
) for society clearly points to the way in which developments inAceh have
had effects well beyond the limits of blackletter law and the particular policy
enactments of formal state institutions. The imple mentation of Islamic law
in Aceh has thus been a project not just—or I would argue, even primarily—
one of legal change sensu stricto, but rather one aiming at far broader social
transformations.
In my forthcoming monograph on Aceh’s contemporary Islamic
legal system, I present detailed analyses of the institutional structures and
everyday operations of the Ulama Council (MPU), the State Sharī’a Agency
(DSI), the Sharī’a Police (WH), and the Sharī’a Courts. 78 My work in Aceh
started five years ago with an eye to providing an empir ically-grounded study
of a contemporary system for the actual applica tion of Islamic law. As I spent
increasing amounts of time at the offices and in the field with people directly
involved, I struggled to understand why, despite the proliferation of offices
and increased staffing, Aceh’s state Sharī’ a institutions appeared not to be
doing very much law. The MPU, for example, dedicates only a small fraction of
its time and resources to working on draft legislation; the DSI is little involved
in administering positive law, WH patrols rarely if ever result in formal arrests,
and consequently only a small number of jināya cases come before the Sharī’a
courts each year. Through studies of these develop ments it has become clear
that the new state structures established for the implementation of Sharī’a
have generally made their most signifi cant impacts outside of the formal legal
sphere.
X. Social Engineering

Social engineering and related terms in various European languages
(sociale ingenieurs in Dutch, social ingenjörskonst in Swedish, etc.) have
carried diverse progressive and pejorative connotations in different circles
over the past century. Carl Macklund has referred to social engi neering as an
important aspect of modernity that can and should be approached in diverse
ways, depending on particular contexts, as “uto pian ideology, as a set of
paternalistic-cum-scientistic practices in oper ation, as a metaphor of state
authority, and as a rhetorical strategy within American industrial betterment
and scientific management.”79 In some cases the term ‘social engineering’ has
been deployed with reference to an “antipolitics” intended to circumvent
Syahrizal, “Strategi Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam,” 20-5.
Feener, Sharī”a as Social Engineering.
79
Carl Marklund, “Adjusting Facts and Values—Reconciling Politics with Science: Some notes on
the Rhetorics of Social Engineering in Depression-Era Sweden and the USA,” Ideas in History II:2 (2007):
10.
77
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the failings of popular democracy, 80 and as a ‘rhetorical tool’ implying
strategies by which subject populations could be manipulated “in such a way
that they came to ‘love their servitude.’”81 Karl Popper vehemently critiqued
what he referred to as ‘Utopian social engineering’ as ‘most dangerous’ for
its “uncompromising radicalism,”82 and today the term ‘social engi neering’ is
associated by some with the pursuit of “lethal utopias” in Nazi Germany and
Stalin’s Soviet Union.83
These negative glosses on social engineering are largely reactions to
the tragic historical trajectories of mid twentieth-century Europe. How-ever
such a myopic view of the concept can obscure important aspects of its earlier
usage that were combined with idealistic agendas for the betterment of both
communities and individual human lives. The ear liest noted reference to ‘social
engineers’ (in the writings of the radical Dutch industrialist J.C. van Marken)
emphasized the development of technical expertise in the “management” of
“specifically human problems.”84 The influential Swedish academic Gunnar
Myrdal explic itly introduced the values of “modern social democratic political
ambitions” 85to determine the direction of social engineering, pro claiming (in
1944), “We have today in social science a greater trust in the improvability of
man and society than we have ever had since the Enlightenment.”86 It must be
noted, however, that the tone of social engineering agendas was not exclusively
secular, particularly in the United States, where in the early twentieth century
a number of would be social engineers also figured as ‘socioreligious uplifters’
with support from ‘Christian Sociologists’ such as Edwin Earp87 and links to
the Social Gospel movement through figures such as Pastor Josiah Strong.88
More specific conceptions of law as social engineering have their own
complex history in modern Western thought, ranging across discussions of
political ideology, policy planning, and jurisprudence. The broad scope of
these discussions parallel in a provocative way contemporary discourses on
Sharī’a among reform minded Muslims in Aceh and elsewhere. In both cases,
discussions of rules, norms and social change extend well beyond the limits of
blackletter law and formal legal institutions.
In his introduction to the English translation of Ehrlich’s magnum opus

80
John M. Jordan, Machine-Age Ideology: Social Engineering and American Liberalism,1911-1939
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
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David Östlund, “A Knower and Friend of Human Beings, Not Machines: e Business Career of the
Terminology of Social Engineering, 1894-1910,” Ideas in History II:2 (2007): 48.
82
Popper does, however, accept a more limited model of what he termed “piecemeal engineering” to deal with specific points of social policy. See Karl Popper, e Open Societyand Its Enemies: Volume
One— e Spell of Plato (New York: Routledge, 2008—originallypublished, 1945), 166-7, 174.
83
Christopher R. Browning and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Frameworks for Social Engineering:
Stalinist Schema of Identification and the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft,” in Beyond Totalitarianism:Stalinism
and Nazism Compared, ed. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (CambridgeUniversity Press, 2009), 23165.
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Östlund, “A Knower and a Friend,” 66-74.
85
Johan Strang, “Overcoming the Rift Between ‘is’ and ‘ought’: Gunnar Myrdal and the Philosophy of Social Engineering,” Ideas in History II:2 (2007): 144.
86 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma:e Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1944), 1023-4; cited in: Strang, “Overcoming the Rift,” 186.
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on the sociology of law, Roscoe Pound called attention to the importance
of established relations of family and community in the production and
maintenance of social order.89 Pound’s own writings take into consideration
diverse, overlapping types of ‘interests’ while also emphasizing the need for
religion and conceptions of morality to support law’s work in engineering
the creation of a just society.90 He maintained that well beyond dealing with
breaches of particular legal rules, judicial and administrative processes
“have a function of guidance as well,”91 and in fact saw legal history as the
record of “a continually more efficacious social engineering.”92 His conception
of law in relation to social change was, however, far from radical, and
might be better characterized as adaptive and realist, rather than idealistic
and transformative. As one of his intellectual biographers has phrased it,
conceptions of ‘organicism’ played a major role in limiting the degree to which
Pound’s vision of the sociology of law could be placed in the service of legal
instrumentalism.93 Later assessments of Pound’s jurisprudence have noted
the great divergence between his views on law as social engineering and the
uses to which his views were put by later jurists and philosophers.94
The term ‘social engineering’ in discussions of legal change appears to
have been introduced into the Indonesian language through the translation
of Pound’s Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, which first appeared in
1963, and has been reprinted at least once every decade ever since.95 Over
the intervening period, the term came to be used in Indonesian language texts
to refer to more proactive programs of social development, thus coming to
reflect the kind of legal instrumentalism to which Pound himself was distinctly
opposed. However, there were also important continuities, particularly in
the recognition of the importance of norms beyond legislation, where social
engineering represented engagement with “that part of the whole field of social
control which may be achieved by adjustment of human relations and ordering
of human conduct through the action of politically organized society.”96 It is in
this context that we should approach the way in which the social engineering
agenda of Aceh’s contemporary Islamic legal system engages with the spheres
of education and ‘socialization’.

Roscoe Pound, “Introduction,” in Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles, xxxiii.
Although this approach to law is mentioned in many of Pound’s numerous articles, the most
sustained treatment can be found in Roscoe Pound, Social Control through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942).
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1955), 47.
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XI. Education and Socialization
The close connections between law, education and social order have a
long and complex course of development in the histories of Muslim societies
extending back to the classical period. 97During the nineteenth century, some
Muslim rulers undertook new patterns of intervention into legal education
that facilitated “fundamental and everlasting changes in the legal system.”98
Since that time, new models of both law and education imported from the
West had a transformative impact on the ways in which Muslims in many parts
of the world came to understand Islam, the Sharī’a, and the latter’s function
in society.99
With the revival of Islam on a global scale since the late twentieth century,
there has been even broader engagement of educational programs in the service
of redefining the role and interpretation of Islamic law in contemporary society.
The social engineering aspects of the contemporary ‘Islamic Trend’ have been
remarked upon by Gregory Starrett with particular reference to the function
of state educational institutions in the process: “Having a captive audience, the
school represents an ideal laboratory for social engineering, particularly if the
knowledge imparted to children is taken home to their families.”100 If this is
true for day schools in Egypt, then all the more so for Aceh’s traditional Islamic
schools (dayah), which have been described by advocates of the Sharī’a system
there as ‘24-hour laboratories for socialization.101
In Aceh, this goal has been pursued not only through the reform of formal
educational institutions, but also in a wide range of other initiatives, including
public outreach media campaigns and programs of popular preaching.102
Projects for the promotion of Sharī’a through such means are generally
referred to locally as sosialisasi . This Indonesian- language term, however,
carries with it a range of meanings that may cause some confusion to those
who read it exclusively in terms of its English cognate. Indeed the standard
dictionary of contemporary Indonesian lists three separate definitions,
ranging from the state seizure of private assets to the dissemination and
publicizing of information. This latter definition is, in fact, perhaps the one
that is most commonly encountered in many Indonesian discourses. There is,
however, a third definition that refers to efforts to promote ideals so that they
are understood and implemented.103 In this sense sosialisasi—in the sense of
97
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Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education (Princeton UniversityPress, 1992).
98
Hallaq, Sharī”a, 135.
99
On the diverse transformative eﬀects of modern styles of education in Muslim societies, see
Dale Eickleman, Knowledge and Power in Morocco: e Education of a Twentieth CenturyNotable (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985); and the essays collected in RobertW. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, ed., Schooling Islam: e Culture and Politicsof Modern Muslim Education (Princeton University Press,
2007). I have discussed the impactof modern educational reforms on Indonesian understandings of Islamic
law in MuslimLegal ought in Modern Indonesia (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
100
Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformation in
Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 116.
101
Hasbi Amiruddin, Menatap Masa Depan Dayah di Aceh (Banda Aceh: Yayasan Pena, 2008), 21.
102
See, for example, Muslim Ibrahim, Penahapan dalam Legislasi dan Penerapan Syari’atIslam (Jakarta: Cahaya Ilahi, 2006), 154.
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the habituating of individuals to behave according to socially-desired norms—
echoes its usage in developmental studies literature where socialization
refers to “processes whereby naïve individuals are taught the skills, behavior
patterns, values, and motivations needed for competent functioning in the
culture.”104
In contemporary Acehnese usage, there is considerable and constant
slippage between these last two conceptions of sosialisasi. Indeed, its very
vagueness seems to be one of the primary attractions, allowing for it to be
used to describe activities ranging from public preaching programs to Sharī’a
Police (WH) spot inspections of women on the street whose clothes and head
coverings do not fit official state definitions of proper Islamic dress.
Programs referred to locally in terms of sosialisasi are common activities
across all of the Islamic legal institutions of Aceh—training, outreach, preaching
and publication programs are being extensively pursued by the courts and the
police force, as well as by the ‘Ulamā’ Council and the State Sharī’a Agency.
The rhetoric of sosialisasi is so prevalent across the system that since 2007
it has become the most common framework of activity for most of Aceh’s
Islamic legal institutions. The contemporary usage of the term by officers of
Aceh’s Sharī’a institutions, however, goes beyond the simple acquisition of
existing norms and values to the deliberate promotion and implantation of
aspirational standards of religious and moral rectitude aimed at facilitating
the development of society as a whole in desired directions.
One important forum for the socialization of the Sharī’a in Aceh is
public preaching. As Barry Hooker has argued, the Friday sermon (khutba)
is “one of the most public faces of Syariah” in contemporary Indonesia. 105
One of the most popular topics of Friday sermons at the iconic Baiturrahman
mosque in Banda Aceh is that of building a ‘new generation’ and building a
just and prosperous and ‘Islamic society.’ 106 Such sentiments are echoed in
the privately-produced newsletters and broadsheets commonly distributed at
Friday prayers in Aceh by various groups advocating aggressive programs of
devotionalism and moral policing that overlap and reinforce the agenda of the
state Sharī’a system, while themselves remaining outside the formal spheres
of government and party politics.107 The topics most frequently treated would
fall under the broad rubrics of religious belief and practice (aqīda and ibādāt).
These are areas that generally would be considered well beyond the sphere
of positive law, properly speaking—but it would be a mistake to write these
off as ‘merely ritual’ concerns, for they comprise important aspects of the all
encompassing program of social transformation advocated by supporters of
Aceh’s contemporary Sharī’a system.108
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While studies of contemporary Islamic revivalism have increasingly
emphasized the need to look beyond politics to appreciate the ‘pedagogic realm’
of modern Islamic discourse, there is a tendency to read da’wa education as
a project of ‘restoring’ of ‘cultural authenticity’ and identity politics.109 These
are undoubtedly important insights, but they can also distract us from other
dimensions of contemporary Islamic agendas of education and socialization.
Thus I would argue that in fact there is still a pervasive under appreciation of the
ways in which modern Islamic education not only searches for roots, but also
actively strives toward the future growth of new models of Muslim community.
The cultivation of new visions of Islam within the Acehnese community
has impacts that are potentially more widely diffuse and enduring than the
passing of any particular piece of legislation, or the establishment of any
particular governmental agency. This is not to deny that there are other
important factors involved here, including manipulations of elite politics at
various levels. These, however, have already been extensively discussed by
other observers of contemporary Aceh. What I would like to do with this work
is something different— to open up some new space for a discussion of the
contemporary experiment with Sharī’a implementation in Aceh that takes
into account some of the broader religious and cultural developments that
inform it.
The dominant model of Islam promoted by Aceh’s Sharī’a institutions
bears a markedly revivalist character that attempts to transform the province
through the implementation of a form of Islam believed to be complementary
to modernizing aspirations of discipline, strength, and economic prosperity.
One key feature of this reform agenda is the emphasis on ‘purifying’ Islamic
belief and practice of corrupt and superstitious innovations.110 For some, the
pursuit of this particular goal should be given priority over any concerns
for more inclusive models of Islamic fraternity ( ukhuwwa), no matter how
disruptive it may be in the short term.111 This radical remaking of Islamic Aceh
is the ultimate goal of those who view the current system of implementing
Islamic law as a form of social engineering. Their accomplishments to date,
however, have been limited by a number of political and cultural factors.112
XII. Remaking Islamic Aceh

While the imposition of formal Sharī’a legislation may have been an
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“unwanted gift” imposed through a top down process initiated and manipulated
by local and national political elites,113 the rhetorical and symbolic wrapping of
the project has subsequently served to echo and amplify broader movements
within contemporary Indonesian Islam for the transformation of society
according to particular visions of Islamic reform. A central aspect of this is an
emphasis on attempts to redefine local conceptions of Islam and its relation
to Acehnese identity. The project of state Sharī’ a may have made its initial
appeals to a rather vague sense of ‘Islam’ as the essence of Acehnese culture
and society (one rooted in ‘traditionalist’ practices and institutions), but in
pursu ing its project of constructing a new Islamic legal system for the prov
ince it has not only created new legislation and an extensive new bureaucracy,
but also has worked to delimit the range of local under standings of ‘Islam’ to
a particular stream of revivalist visions that has been gaining some degree of
increasing acceptance across various sectors of society.
The contemporary Sharī’a system in Aceh is deeply engaged in a project
of shaping a modern Muslim subjectivity in tune with the key values of the
developmentalist state, as evidenced by Aceh’s Islamic legislation and the
work of the State Sharī’a Agency. This transforma tion is elaborated within a
framework that conceptualizes Islam in terms of an all encompassing system
regulating every aspect of both indi vidual and social life.114 While this vision
of Islam as a ‘complete system’ is widely shared by revivalists across the
contemporary Islamic world, in post tsunami Aceh it takes on new dimensions
when read against the backdrop of ‘total reconstruction.’
The re definition of Acehnese Islam has included the promotion of
rigidified communitarian conceptions of Islam, combined with an intensive
scrutiny of the belief, ritual practice, symbolic allegiance, and outward
manifestations of moralism among those who claim to belong to the Acehnese
umma. The rationale articulated by many behind the Sharī’a agenda there is
often expressed as a project of “raising awareness” in which, for example, the
imposition of physical punishments such as caning are cast not as punitive
measures, but rather as “a means of education and construction” for convicted
offenders, while also provid ing a warning for society at large (efek jera).115
These attitudes are clearly demonstrated in both the rhetoric and the
functional operations of the Sharī’a Police and the Islamic Courts.
The appeal to more general social and cultural norms beyond the
sphere of formal law advanced by earlier jurists such as Pound can help us to
appreciate in a more expansive way the role of the Sharī’a in stitutions in Aceh
in remaking Islam in new ways across diverse fields ranging from theology and
ritual practice to fashion and mosque archi tecture. There is a distinct logic
of discourse and practice underlying the activities of the official institutions
of Islamic law in Aceh that has yet to receive the attention it deserves in
international scholarship, largely because of the way in which such work has
tended to focus almost exclusively on formal legislation and (relatively rare)
cases of the application of corporal punishment. However, in increasingly
directing its energies and resources toward ‘socialization’ projects, Aceh’s
contem porary Sharī’a institutions are placed in the service not just of regulat
113
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ing human interaction through discipline and punishment, but also of facilitating
the formation of particular religious and behavioral disposi tions among the
community at large. These social transformations have the potential to exert far
more significant, long-term impacts than the passing of any particular piece of
legislation or the ephemeral electoral victory of any political party. Indeed, as
Roscoe Pound noted in his introduction to Ehrlich’s major work on ‘living law’,
“the inner order maintained by the rules of conduct recognized and generally
followed as binding… function notwithstanding the dissolution of a political
order.”116
Sharīa is particularly powerful for providing such binding rules of
conduct because it is, on one level, a sufficiently abstract notion to appeal
to anyone who would consider him or herself Muslim. At the same time,
however, under this broad assent to Sharī’a as an ideal, there are immense
spaces for the elaboration of very specific positions on a wide range of social
and political—as well as more specifically reli gious—issues. Such a situation
allows the possibility, of course, for great manipulation by certain powerful
interests. One thinks, for example, of the ways in which, in the United States
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the use of what was on one
level an abstract, universally accepted notion of ‘freedom’ was rhetorically
manipulated to quell any opposition to the particular policies of the Bush
adminis tration. Similar dynamics have been operative in Aceh, where support
ers of the current Sharī’a system have branded those Muslim Acehnese
critical of particular aspects of its workings as ‘opposing Islam.’ That being
said, however, there is far more to Sharī’ a in Aceh than political party power
squabbles, and the commitment to using Sharī’a as a means to build a new
Aceh is passionately held by many involved in the daily application of the
contemporary legal system. These Muslims are important participants in what
has become a highly contested public sphere of debate over the interpretation
and formal role of Islamic law in Acehnese society.
XIII. Conclusions

This essay has sought to demonstrate the need for a reevaluation of the
perspectives that have dominated most commentary on Aceh’s Islamic legal
system to date. It is, of course, clear that the political machinations of various
factions have played an important role in both the establishment and the
subsequent development of Islamic law in the province, and a considerable
number of studies examining aspects of Sharī’a politics have been published
over recent years.117 However a my topic focus on the back and forths of local
political drama can obscure an analytic focus on the underlying ideology
and institutional logics that inform the work of the system’s architects and
administrators. Situating their vision of Sharī’a within the broader context
of social reconstruction in the post tsunami/post conflict period helps us to

Pound, “Introduction,” xxxiii.
For example: Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: e Islamization of Law inModern Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 143-67; Elizabeth F.Drexler, Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 158-68; Kamaruzzaman
Bustamam-Ahmad, Islamic Law in Southeast Asia:A Study of its Application in Kelantan and Aceh (Chiang
Mai: Silkworm, 2009); Moch. NurIchwan, “Oﬃcial Ulema and the Politics of Re-Islamization: e Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama, Sharī’atization and Contested Authority in Post-New Order Aceh,” Journal ofIslamic
Studies 22.2 (2011): 183-214.
116
117

Year 3 Vol. 3, September - December 2013

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 309 ~

better appreciate the ways in which Islamic law is deployed as a tool of social
engineering.
Looking at this contemporary Islamic legal system as an experiment in
social engineering also challenges another common trend in understanding
contemporary calls for the implementation of Islamic law: a nostalgic utopian
yearning for a return to seventh-century Arabia. In Aceh, this is clearly not
the case, and even the occasional rhetorical flourishes referencing Aceh’s
seventeenth-century ‘Golden Age’ under Sultan Iskandar Muda are embedded
within an ideological framework that is overwhelmingly oriented toward the
future, and not the past.118 The case of Aceh thus clearly demonstrates the
possibility, and the promise, of realigning our perspective on contemporary
Muslim projects for the implementation of Islamic law as projects for futureoriented social transformation—rather than simply as a series of reactive
measures to perceived ‘crises of modernity’ and/or the political machinations
of rival elites contesting control of state power. Aceh may be exceptional in
its implementation of an Islamic legal system in the immediate wake of both
war and natural disaster. I would argue, however, that this dramatic setting
actually serves to cast sharper relief on the complex array of influences that
may be found to animate agendas for the establishment of state Sharī’a in
other contexts far removed from its Sumatran shores.
Contemporary debates on Islamic law are formed and developed in
constant contact with multiple and diverse discourses on law and society
that come from outside of the tradition to inform the ways that increasing
numbers of Muslims have come to think about the Sharī’a. It is thus crucial
for scholars of Islamic law and society to extend their analyses to explore the
possible effects of these influences on evolving formulations of Islamic law
and its legal methodology. In his widely studied work on legal traditions,
Patrick Glenn presents models for understanding both the internal dynamics
of, and relations between, complex traditions. In an elegant expression of how
he conceptualizes the latter, Glenn writes: any contact between traditions
involves exchange of information. If something is known to be out there, it
is already in here. e simple existence of information derived from another
complex tradition thus blurs the distinction between two traditions. Moreover,
if the information is in here, it becomes subject to the multivalent, bridging,
complexity of the receiving tradition. It must be dealt with.119
In the case of Aceh, we find a striking example of the extent to which
such multivalent bridging has functioned to introduce an exceedingly wide
range of new discourses into contemporary conversations of Islamic law and
reconceptualizations of its role in regulating social change. The integration
of elements from such far flung fields as post disaster reconstruction
and American sociological jurisprudence into Muslim discourse has had
a significant impact on the shape and substance of debates in Aceh. Seeing
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these developments thrown into stark relief against the dramatic backdrop of
social transformation in post conflict, post tsunami Aceh serves to help us to
develop new perspectives on heretofore underappreciated kinds of influences
on contemporary interpretations of Islamic law in both theory and practice.
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